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Abstract
The EU adopted a new enlargement strategy for the Western Balkans countries 
in 2018, provided a time frame for Serbia and Montenegro potentially to join the 
Union by 2025, and outlined the next steps for accession for Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. In March 2020, the EU gave the green 
light to the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania, and also 
introduced a new reformed ‘accession talks’ framework. The strengthening of the 
rule of law, fighting corruption and organised crime are the cornerstones of the EU-
Western Balkans strategy of 2018 and the new accession talks framework of 2020. 
This article examines the latest enlargement policy developments in 2018–2020 by 
conceptualising how the EU promotes the rule of law in the Western Balkans thor-
ough its new enlargement policy package. Furthermore, the article offers an in-depth 
analysis of the case of Albania, where the EU has experimented with some of its 
latest enlargement-policy ideas in regard to the rule of law. The article also offers 
some proposals and insights on how the EU rule of law initiative of 2018 can be 
improved, in order to become more transformative in strengthening the rule of law 
in countries of the Western Balkans.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this article is to explain the latest EU enlargement policy devel-
opment in the years 2018–2020, and how the EU is trying to promote the impor-
tance of strengthening the rule of law in its latest enlargement policy package for 
six countries in the Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia1. The contribution to scholarship made 
in this article aims to offer an analysis of the EU-Western Balkans strategy adopted 
in February 2018, and the newly revised ‘accession talks’ framework for Albania 
and North Macedonia adopted by the European Council in March 2020.
In particular, the focus of this article is to examine how the EU policy on the 
rule of law for candidate states has evolved over the years, and what the EU wants 
to achieve by reforming the judicial system (Appicciafuoco 2010). The article con-
ceptualises how the EU is trying to promote the rule of law through its enlargement 
policy, offering an analysis of the ongoing judicial reform in Albania as a case study. 
The article also offers a discussion as to why the EU has made the reforming of the 
justice systems in the Western Balkans central to its new enlargement policy, in the 
light of the recent constitutional reforms in Poland and Hungary, which show signs 
of ‘democratic backsliding’ (Bátora and Fossum 2019) on the rule of law and liberal 
democratic standards. The thesis is that for the EU rule of law initiative to have a 
lasting impact in the Western Balkans, it is not sufficient to only focus on vetting the 
justice system, as in the case of Albania, to strengthen the rule of law.
The article also theorises the model of governance used by the European Com-
mission in designing its rule of law initiative in the EU-Western Balkans Strategy 
of 2018, and explains its operation in practice. There is an analysis of the potential 
challenges that the rule of law initiative may face in becoming a transformative tool 
to strengthen the rule of law in the Western Balkans, given that there is a high pre-
served level of corruption, and furthermore, the argument that the legal and political 
conditions are not currently as favourable in the Western Balkans for the rule of law 
initiative to succeed, because these countries are semi-autocratic systems, and there 
is little political will to strengthen and subscribe to EU rule of law principles.
2  The Latest EU Enlargement Policy Developments in 2018–2020
2.1  The EU‑Western Balkans Strategy of 2018
The EU’s enlargement policy on the Western Balkans has been running on ‘auto-
pilot’ for the last fifteen years, and the accession process is perceived as a box-tick-
ing exercise, both by scholars and by the European Parliament2. After the onset of 
2 European Parliament (2015) The Western Balkans and EU Enlargement: Lessons learned, ways for-
ward and prospects ahead. Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies. (online) Avail-
1 Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia and are official candidate countries for accession 
to the European Union. Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo are potential candidates for the EU.
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the eurozone crisis at the end of 2009, EU enlargement no longer featured on the 
EU policy agenda (Gstohl 2016). However, after the Brexit vote, the Commission 
began to re-engage in its enlargement policy in the hope of keeping the EU project 
alive, and in the 2017 State of the Union address, the then Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker3 stated that the Western Balkans should become future mem-
bers of the EU (Belloni and Brunazzo 2017). The EU Member States supported the 
Commission’s idea of extending the EU to the Western Balkans, and thus both the 
enlargement policy and the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU were 
restored and placed high on the EU policy agenda (Anghel 2018). Issues concerned 
with the rule of law, justice and fundamental rights (Berger 2019) were to be the 
central criteria in the EU accession talks with the Western Balkans, as emphasised 
in the 2017 State of the Union address4.
In February 2018, the Commission followed this up by adopting the ‘Credible 
Enlargement Perspective for an Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Bal-
kans’ strategy,5 which came almost fifteen years after the last EU-Western Balkans 
Summit, in Thessaloniki (Van Meurs 2003) in 20036. The EU-Western Balkans 
strategy of 2018 introduced some renewed policy objectives on the future enlarge-
ment of the EU, and viewed the Western Balkans as a geostrategic investment for 
the Union bloc. At the same time, the EU also hoped to revive its future direction of 
Union in its entirety, after the damaging Brexit vote (Ker-Lindsay 2017). According 
to (Louwerse and Kassoti 2019), fulfilling the rule of law conditions set out in the 
Copenhagen criteria is key to the success of the Western Balkans in their accession 
talks with the EU.
3 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Address, 13 September 
2017: ‘If we want more stability in our neighbourhood, then we must maintain a credible enlargement 
perspective for the Western Balkans. It is clear that there will be no further enlargement during the man-
date of this Commission and this Parliament. No candidate is ready. But thereafter the European Union 
will be greater than 27 in number. Accession candidates must give the rule of law, justice and funda-
mental rights utmost priority in the negotiations.’ (online) Available at: https ://ec.europ a.eu/commi ssion /
press corne r/detai l/en/fs_19_6414 Accessed 12 August 2020.
4 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Address, 13 September 
2017. (online) Available at: https ://ec.europ a.eu/commi ssion /press corne r/detai l/en/fs_19_6414 Accessed 
12 August 2020.
5 European Commission (2018), ‘Communication on a Credible Enlargement Perspective for and 
Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans’, COM (2018) 65 final.
6 In the EU-Western Balkans Summit in 2003 in Thessaloniki, the EU initially made a pledge to expand 
the Union into the Western Balkans. See the European Commission Press Release (18 June 2003), 
‘The Thessaloniki Summit: A Milestone in the European Union’s Relations with the Western Balkans’. 
(online) Available at: https ://ec.europ a.eu/commi ssion /press corne r/detai l/en/IP_03_860 Accessed 20 
May 2020.
able at: https ://www.europ arl.europ a.eu/RegDa ta/etude s/IDAN/2015/53499 9/EXPO_IDA(2015)53499 
9_EN.pdf Accessed 20 May 2020.
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The 2018 EU-Western Balkans strategy focuses on building good neighbourly 
relations, in light of the long-standing ethnic disputes in the region. Further, it sets 
out six ‘flagship initiatives’, which are areas of common interest to both the EU and 
the Western Balkans, namely: (1) the rule of law; (2) security and migration; (3) 
socio-economic development; (4) transport and energy connectivity; (5) the digital 
agenda; and (6) reconciliation and good neighbourly relations7. In essence, these 
flagship initiatives provide a framework and building blocks for developing future 
joint action plans in each of these six key areas, to be designed by the Commission 
and the respective Western Balkans governments, through a technical and political 
dialogue on reform aligned to EU governance standards (Wunsch, Kmezić, Stratulat 
and Tzifakis 2019). In this article, I consider and conceptualise the rule of law ini-
tiative, accompanied by a theoretical discussion of how the EU has identified these 
flagship initiatives as key priority areas for reform during the accession negotiations 
phase, and the design of the governance model for their practical operation—which 
at first glance appears to be based on the Open Method of Coordination.
In 2019, a year after the EU-Western Balkans strategy, the EU published country 
progress reports8 for each of the Western Balkans countries. The reports provided an 
in-depth assessment of the progress made by each of the Western Balkans countries 
in fulfilling the EU accession criteria9—in particular, progress towards meeting the 
criteria related to the rule of law (Sargentini and Dimitrovs 2016). On this occasion, 
the Commission also made proposals to the 27 EU Member States for its Council 
meeting to discuss the state of affairs in the Western Balkans, especially consider-
ing whether these countries were complying with the Copenhagen criteria related to 
the function of the rule of law (Fouéré 2019). The main proposals issued to the 27 
EU Member States were that the Commission identified Serbia and Montenegro as 
front-runners for EU accession, and recommended that both countries be allowed 
to join the Union by 202510. Whilst this theoretical date was intended to encourage 
both Serbia and Montenegro to continue their internal reforms towards fulfilling the 
7 European Commission (2018), ‘Communication on A credible enlargement perspective for and 
enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans’, COM (2018) 65 final.
8 In the country reports, the Commission usually makes recommendations and introduces the condi-
tions that each Candidate State must meet before it can make further progress towards joining the EU—it 
mainly includes adopting laws and policies in areas related to the 35 chapters of the acquis ‘accession 
chapters or criteria’.
9 The Treaty on the European Union sets out the conditions (Article 49) and principles (Article 6(1)) 
to which any country wishing to become an EU member must conform. These criteria are known as 
the Copenhagen criteria, and were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and later 
strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995. For EU accession negotiations to be launched, a 
country must satisfy the first criteria, and they are as following: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; (2) a function-
ing market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; 
(3) ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the 
rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the ’acquis’), and adherence to the aims 
of political, economic and monetary union. (online) Available at: https ://eur-lex.europ a.eu/summa ry/
gloss ary/acces sion_crite ria_copen hague .html Accessed 12 August 2020.
10 European Commission (2018), ‘Communication on a Credible Enlargement Perspective for an 
Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans’, COM (2018) 65 final.
The EU Rule of Law Initiative Towards the Western Balkans 
123
EU acquis,11 a sustainable track record and tangible progress towards the Copenha-
gen criteria12 (especially Chapter 23 and 24 of the acquis, on ‘judiciary and funda-
mental rights’13 and ‘security and justice’14 (Hillion 2016) were clearly identified 
as being indispensable, in order to have any hope of joining the EU in such a time-
frame. For Albania15 and North Macedonia,16 the Commission proposed that the 
Member States grant the opening of accession talks with no further pre-conditions. 
Albania had to pass a comprehensive judicial reform with a view to strengthening 
the rule of law and making progress in complying with the Copenhagen criteria, 
which was adopted in June 2016, by changing more than one-third of its constitu-
tion as a major pre-condition to the opening of accession talks with the EU (Hox-
haj 2020)17. North Macedonia, in contrast, as a major pre-condition, had to resolve 
a three-decade-long dispute about its name with its neighbour Greece (Bechev 
2019)18. In 2018, both countries signed the Treaty of Prespa, which included chang-
ing the name of the country from the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ to 
the ‘Republic of North Macedonia’ (Vankovska 2020). The Commission proposed 
to the Member States that Bosnia and Herzegovina19 be granted the EU candidate 
status, and that visa liberalisation be granted to Kosovo20.
In the conclusions of the June 2019 Council meeting, the 27 EU Member 
States acknowledged the progress achieved in the Western Balkans based upon the 
17 Hoxhaj 2020, p.168.
18 Bechev 2019, p.26–28.
19 European Commission (2019), ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the 
European Union’, COM (2019) 261 final.
20 European Commission (2019) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 2019 Com-
munication on EU Enlargement Policy on Albania 2019 Report’ COM (2019) 260 final.
11 The Community acquis or acquis Communautaire, sometimes also called the EU acquis and often 
shortened to acquis, is the accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the 
body of European Union law. During the process of the enlargement of the European Union, the acquis 
is divided into 35 chapters for the purpose of negotiation between the EU and the Candidate Member 
States.
12 Since the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the EU has defined that the candidate country has 
to achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights (known as 
the Copenhagen criteria). These key elements later became Chapters 23 and 24, and fundamental to the 
accession process.
13 The elements compiled under Chapter 23 are closely linked to the political criteria which need to be 
met for overall negotiations to begin. They include four main headings: the judiciary; the fight against 
corruption; fundamental rights; and EU citizens’ rights.
14 Chapter 24 covers the fight against all types of organised crime, including drug and arms trafficking, 
the trafficking in human beings, and terrorism. It also includes alignment with the Schengen rules, border 
control and visas, as well as migration, asylum, judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters, and 
police and customs cooperation.
15 European Commission (2019), ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 2019 
Communication on EU Enlargement Policy on Albania 2019 Report’ COM (2019) 260 final.
16 ibid.
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Commission’s findings21. However, Member States continued to express concern 
regarding the Western Balkans’ compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the 
lack of the rule of law, and thus did not endorse the country report recommendations 
to open accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia and grant visa liberalisa-
tion to Kosovo, and they made no commitment to granting EU candidate status to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina—although the Member States suggested that they would 
review the Commission proposal to start accession talks with Albania and North 
Macedonia in the autumn of 2019. Moreover, the Member States indicated that they 
viewed accession in 2025 as creating an extremely ambitious timetable for Serbia 
and Montenegro to join the Union. Notwithstanding the reservations and hesitation 
from Members States on specific steps forward in expanding the EU in the Western 
Balkans, there was a general consensus to support the EU foreign and security pol-
icy objective as a long-term geopolitical strategy and security investment (Burlyuk 
2020).
2.2  The Rule of Law Flagship Initiative in the EU‑Western Balkans Strategy 
of 2018
In the 2018 EU-Western Balkans strategy it is acknowledged that there are clear ele-
ments of state capture, including links with organised crime and corruption at all 
levels of government and administration in the Western Balkans, and the rule of law 
is weak (Richter and Wunsch 2019). Thus, the rule of law initiative ought to be one 
of the most important initiatives of the six flagship initiatives in the strategy, and 
should receive more attention from both the EU and the Western Balkans if they 
are to crack down on state capture and seriously fight corruption at the highest level 
(Elbasani and Šabić 2018).
When evaluating the EU-Western Balkans strategy of 2018, there are as yet no 
concrete proposals nor a roadmap for strengthening the rule of law, but only some 
broad policy objectives. We should rather understand the strategy as a platform for 
the Western Balkans and the Commission to engage in a dialogue to transform the 
rule of law flagship initiative into a joint action plan. Reforming the judicial sys-
tem is an end goal, a by-product of which should serve to strengthen independent 
institutions to be able to uphold the rule of law without political interference22. The 
strategy indicates that the Commission will work closely with the Western Balkans 
towards ensuring that the judiciary is reformed in line with the highest EU stand-
ards and the Copenhagen criteria, and will offer technical and financial support in 
the fight against corruption and organised crime as part of the rule of law initia-
tive. There are no clear examples of the EU and the Western Balkans developing a 
22 European Commission (2018), ‘Communication on a Credible Enlargement Perspective for an 
Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans’, COM (2018) 65 final.
21 European Council (2019), ‘Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Process’ Press release. (online) Available at: https ://www.consi lium.europ a.eu/en/press /press -relea 
ses/2019/06/18/counc il-concl usion s-on-enlar gemen t-and-stabi lisat ion-and-assoc iatio n-proce ss Accessed 
20 May 2020.
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joint action plan or strategy on fighting corruption and organised crime, or how such 
cooperation would fit within the overall initiative on rule of law as yet, since there 
is no joint action plan as a direct outcome of the rule of law initiative, nor explicit 
indication of what any help might include—but it seems that it may involve expand-
ing the operation of Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) to the 
Western Balkans, with a view to fighting transnational organised-crime networks 
that use a route through the Western Balkans to access the EU23.
The implicit principle in the rule of law initiative of the 2018 EU-Western Bal-
kans strategy is that a clear track record in the fight against corruption and organised 
crime at the highest level is required, in order to show true commitment towards 
meeting the core EU membership criteria (Müller 2015) regarding both the rule of 
law and the overall Copenhagen criteria, if countries want to be taken seriously in 
their bids to join the EU (Hillion 2011). In other words, the Western Balkans must 
show a record of indictments of public officials who have either abused their power 
or engaged in corruption, or been part of or associated with an organised-crime net-
work, as the first step of good faith in their commitments towards the Copenhagen 
criteria. This is a clear indication that the EU will not take the Western Balkans seri-
ously if there is a continuation of political interference (Fagan and Kopecký 2018) 
in judicial decisions, investigations, and indictments of high-level officials. Further-
more, the underlying message in the rule of law initiative is that the Commission 
plans to make use of all of the leverage provided in the accession talks frameworks 
for as long as possible, by delaying the Western Balkans accession to the EU in 
order to avoid any repetition of the scenarios of Hungary and Poland (Grabbe and 
Lehne 2017), where there were clear elements of backsliding in their commitments 
to the rule of law (Adamski 2019), or, in the cases of Bulgaria,24 Slovakia,25 and 
Malta,26 where high-profile politicians were observably involved in corruption and 
organised-crime networks.27
23 In 2019, Frontex fledged a joint operation outside the EU for the first time by deploying over 50 offic-
ers to Albania in supporting border control, with a view to fighting translational crime networks that 
use the Western Balkans route through Albania to smuggle migrants and illegal narcotics and migration 
into the Union. See Frontex News Release (2019) Frontex Management Board Meets with Partners from 
the Western Balkans. (online) Available at: https ://front ex.europ a.eu/media -centr e/news-relea se/front ex-
manag ement -board -meets -with-partn ers-from-the-weste rn-balka ns-1wf8k 8 Accessed 20 May 2020.
24 In Bulgaria, an investigative journalist, Viktoria Marinova, was killed in 2018 for investigationg an 
alleged fraud involving EU funds linked to businessmen and politicians. (online) Available at: https ://
www.thegu ardia n.com/world /2018/oct/07/tv-journ alist -bruta lly-murde red-in-bulga rian-town-of-ruse 
Accessed 20 May 2020.
25 In Slovakia, an investigative journalist, Ján Kuciak, was killed in 2018 for discovering high levels 
of corruption and links to organised crime. (online) Available at: https ://www.dw.com/en/in-memor y-of-
ján-kucia k-the-immor tal-searc h-for-truth /a-52464 911 Accessed 20 May 2020.
26 In Malta, an investigative journalist, Daphne Caruana Galizia, was killed in 2017 for undercovering 
politicians linked to corruption and organised crime. In 2019, the Malta’s PM, Joseph Muscat, resigned 
as a result of the investigation into the murder of the journalist. (online) Available at: https ://www.thegu 
ardia n.com/membe rship /2020/feb/08/malta -daphn e-carua na-galiz ia-murde r-journ alist -inves tigat ion 
Accessed 20 May 2020.
27 European Parliament (2019) Press Release on Malta and Slovakia: Serious Shortcomings in the Rule 
of Law. (online) Available at https ://www.europ arl.europ a.eu/news/en/press -room/20190 218IP R2696 4/
malta -and-slova kia-serio us-short comin gs-in-the-rule-of-law Accessed 20 May 2020.
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However, further analysis is required with regard to the proposal to develop a 
joint ‘action plan to reform the judiciary’, under the rule of law initiative in the EU-
Western Balkans strategy of 2018—which the Commission, together with Western 
Balkans countries, may develop in the next two years.28 To date, no action plan has 
been published as a direct outcome of the rule of law initiative, and it is difficult to 
assess how it will be operated in practice once deployed. However, there are some 
signs that the operation and governance model of the rule of law initiative is based 
on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The next section, I discuss the theory 
of the model of governance that the Commission used, and how it may work in prac-
tice when fully developed. Furthermore, the theory behind the OMC can help in 
understanding the operation of rule of law initiative for the Western Balkans.
2.3  The Rule of Law Initiative as a Form of the Open Method of Coordination
In analysing the rule of law initiative, one can see that the main outcome appears 
to aim at producing a joint action plan on how the Western Balkans can reform its 
judicial systems, with an end goal of sustainable improvement in the rule of law, to 
be acceptable to EU liberal democratic standards and in line with the Copenhagen 
criteria. One could argue that the framework for how the Commission aims to work 
with the Western Balkans governments in producing the joint action plan is largely 
based upon the OMC model. Let us now briefly examine this model, considering its 
impact on the design of the rule of law initiative for the Western Balkans, and the 
potential for further use of the OMC model once the joint action plans are deployed 
in practice.
The OMC (Zeitlin 2005) is an instrument of European integration, and its method 
is applied in policy fields where the main competences still rest with the Member 
States. It is a soft law instrument which employs non-binding objectives and guide-
lines to bring about change in law and policy areas. The term ‘OMC’ was introduced 
in the 2000 Lisbon Strategy (Dawson 2011) to achieve greater convergence between 
Member States in areas where the EU did not have competence—most notably, 
labour market and social policies (Rogowski 2015). Erika Szyszczak (2006) argues 
that the advent of the OMC in EU policymaking and governance models builds upon 
the long tradition of soft-law processes used in policymaking, and in experimenta-
tion with new forms of governance, drawing upon the success of the Commission’s 
monitoring of traditional hard law directives and the peer review ‘name and shame’ 
mechanisms, utilised in the implementation and monitoring of the internal market 
programme, which have gradually been extended to other policy areas (De la Porte 
and Pochet 2012); this now also appears in the EU enlargement policy.
It must be noted that there are differences between the various OMC models, 
depending on the policy area in question, but usually the procedures and overall 
format is the same (Dawson 2011). First, the Member States in the Council meet-
ings set policy goals with the recommendations of the Commission, which are then 
28 European Commission (2018), ‘Communication on a Credible Enlargement Perspective for an 
Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans’, COM (2018) 65 final.
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applied in each of the Member States according to their needs. Second, implementa-
tion is evaluated against benchmarks and indicators which have been agreed upon 
among the participants in the process—usually, there is time period of two years, 
and successive steps are laid out through an action plan which establishes when the 
policy goals or reforms should take place. Third, the results of the implementation 
are evaluated by the Commission, and also compared against best practices between 
each of the Member States, in order to identify which country might be the best 
example to follow in the next cycle (Rogowski 2015). The end results of the evalu-
ations by the Commission and the recommendations for the next two-year cycle are 
not explicitly binding for Member States, because the process itself is not legally 
binding. However, the ‘peer pressure’ element in the OMC model usually encour-
ages Member States to be more proactive in implementing deeper reforms than they 
might otherwise have done without such external scrutiny, as they now run the risk 
of being compared unfavourably to their fellow Member States (Beveridge and Vel-
luti 2016).
These elements and aspects of the OMC model can be found throughout the EU-
Western Balkans strategy of 2018—in particular, with regard to how the rule of law 
initiative is to be deployed in practice. Once the joint action plan has been developed 
and the rule of law initiative is implemented, it will include establishing guidelines, 
quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks, and national and regional 
targets backed by periodic evaluations and peer review, possibly every two years. 
The Commission indicates that the key objective of the joint action plans is the 
reform and transformation of the judicial system—in other words, it aims to ensure 
the safeguarding of the rule of law against the benchmark set in the Copenhagen cri-
teria (Mendelski 2016a). This explicit approach, coupled with the use of developing 
impact indicators, trial-monitoring, and case-based peer-review missions to moni-
tor the implementation of the judicial reform in the joint action plan, are indicators 
that the OMC is the Commission’s model of governance for its enlargement policy, 
promoting the strengthening of the rule of law by reforming the judiciary (Kmezić 
2017).
Therefore, when evaluating the EU-Western Balkans Six Flagship Initiative, one 
could argue that the Commission has envisioned its implementation based upon the 
OMC model. The Commission suggests that the rule of law initiative aims to foster 
mutual learning (Armstrong and Kilpatrick 2007) about successful judicial reforms 
between the Western Balkans countries, and learn best practices from Member 
States which had weak rule of law architecture when they initially joined the EU—
such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania (Mungiu-Pippidi 2018). In summary, the 
rule of law initiative in the EU-Western Balkans 2018 strategy seems to have been 
designed by the Commission as a soft law instrument, relying on the OMC model as 
one proven to have been successfully used by the Commission in other policy areas, 
and which is now being experimented with in EU enlargement policy, with a focus 
on reforming the judicial system as a means to strengthen the rule of law in the 
Western Balkans.
At the time of writing (September 2020), no action plan has been developed 
as a direct outcome of the rule of law initiative. Analysing an existing plan would 
have made it easier to establish the extent to which the Commission in the 2018 
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EU-Western Balkans strategy has based its application of the rule of law initiative 
on the OMC model in practical terms. For the present, the elements of the OMC are 
only visible in the design of the rule of law initiative—but future research may con-
tribute to analysing the governance model in greater depth, once the action plan has 
been developed and applied in practice.
The postponement of the joint action plan and the implementation of the six flag-
ship initiatives of the EU-Western Balkans strategy of 2018 is mainly attributed to 
the reluctance on the part of some Member States to accept the current design of 
the EU enlargement policy (Mendelski 2016b)—in particular, the accession talks 
framework. In March 2020, at the request of France, the Commission came up with 
a new accession talks framework for the Western Balkans. It is not yet clear how 
the rule of law initiative proposed in the 2018 EU-Western Balkans strategy will 
be applied in the light of this new accession talks framework, differing as it does 
from the previous one, in which the six flagship initiatives were tailored. However, it 
might include of a mixture of hard and soft law instruments. This approach diverges 
from the OMC model of governance, as some Member States want to have more 
direct involvement in the EU enlargement process in the future, rather than leave it 
to the Commission. This shift was recently made more concrete, as the next section 
will explain in more depth. Issues concerning fundamental rights, and in particular 
the rule of law, will be central to the new accession talks framework for the Western 
Balkans.
3  The New 2020 Accession Talks Framework for Albania and North 
Macedonia
North Macedonia has been a candidate for EU membership since 2005, and Alba-
nia since 2014. Over the past few years, the Commission has championed the idea 
that both North Macedonia and Albania are ready to open accession talks with the 
Union. However, Member States have not agreed to this—and in October 2019 
the situation came to a head, when France, the Netherlands and Denmark strongly 
opposed opening accession talks with the two countries, in particular Albania.
In the October 2019 Council meeting, France blocked the opening of accession 
talks with North Macedonia and Albania by presenting two main arguments for their 
veto: first, the EU needs to strengthen its existing policies and institutions before 
adding any new members; and second, that the enlargement policy and accession 
talks process is flawed, as there is no guarantee that the candidate state will sub-
scribe to the Copenhagen criteria and uphold the rule of law and the EU liberal dem-
ocratic values once they join the EU. The main rationale behind France’s decision 
was based upon the notion that, once a country becomes a Member State of the EU, 
there are no adequate mechanisms to address subsequent backsliding of democratic 
standards and the rule of law (Smith 2019); these concerns come in light of the 
ongoing developments in Hungary and Poland. These are valid arguments when one 
considers the backsliding of liberal democratic standards in some Member States, 
and it must conceded that the EU requires reform in order to bolster the eurozone, 
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and its decision-making processes (Rhinard 2019) in responding more swiftly to cri-
ses—highlighted even more by the COVID-19 pandemic crises.
However, France was heavily criticised both by its fellow Member States and the 
Commission, for damaging the credibility of the EU as a geopolitical power in the 
Western Balkans through its veto to open accession talks with Albania and North 
Macedonia29. Furthermore, Member States criticised the French government deci-
sion to block accession talks because they were not based upon reforming the EU 
enlargement policy, but were more a response to internal French politics in order 
to bolster President Macron’s stand against the Eurosceptics in France who openly 
oppose European enlargement. The same conclusion can be drawn for other Mem-
ber States where Eurosceptic parties are on the rise, and there is an increase in the 
opposition to further European integration (Kuhn 2019). One should also not under-
estimate the rise of Islamophobia within the internal politics of some Member States 
(Jackson 2018), given that Albania is a country with a large Muslim population, 
and that 25 per cent of the population of North Macedonia are ethnic Albanians 
who share the Muslim faith. There are Member States uncomfortable with the idea 
of a country with a large Muslim majority30 ever joining the EU (Noutcheva and 
Düzgit 2011). However, this is not a determining factor at the moment, since all 
of the six Western Balkans countries together comprise about 18 million people, 
and Albania’s population is only about 3.4 million, of which almost 1.4 million are 
already living abroad. Currently the main debate about the EU enlargement towards 
the Western Balkans is more focused on issues concerning widespread corruption, 
organised crime and state capture, and the restricted capacity for independent insti-
tutions to uphold the rule of law.
In its response to the criticism described above, France published a proposal on 
how to reform the EU accession process framework, entitled the ‘French Non-paper: 
Reversibility Needed in New Enlargement Strategy’,31 published in November 2019. 
This later become an influential proposal on how the Commission could move for-
ward in its engagement with the Western Balkans and put the rule of law as the cen-
tral criteria for upcoming negotiation talks with Albania and North Macedonia. The 
French proposal suggested that the future EU accession process should not be based 
upon opening and closing the 35 chapters of the acquis, but should be transformed 
into a process of seven phases, concerning: (1) the rule of law and fundamental 
rights; (2) education and research; (3) employment and social affairs; (4) financial 
29 Financial Time Editorial Board (2019), ‘Emmanuel Macron’s EU Accession Veto is a Historic Mis-
take: Bloc should Open Talks with North Macedonia and Albania, then Reform itself’ (online). Available 
at: https ://www.ft.com/conte nt/eda39 e1e-f3eb-11e9-b018-3ef87 94b17 c6 Accessed 20 May 2020.
30 It is well documented that in early 2000, when Turkey was actively more pro-European and its foreign 
policy goal was to join the EU, there were reservations on the part of some Member States about allow-
ing a country with a large Muslim population to be part of the Union. EU Members have been mulling 
over either suspending or ending the talks since November 2016, as the Turkish government policies 
under Erdogan are viewed by the majority of the Member States to have eroded the rule of law and 
human rights standards.
31 ‘Reforming the European Union Accession Process’, Non-Paper, November 2019 (online) Available 
at: https ://www.polit ico.eu/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2019/11/Enlar gemen t-nonpa per.pdf Accessed 20 May 
2020.
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affairs; (5) the single market, agriculture, and fisheries; (6) foreign affairs; and (7) 
‘others’ In other words, under this proposed format, the 35 chapters of acquis are to 
be restructured into these seven phases, which would then form policy blocs. The 
issues concerning the rule of law and fundamental rights (Huszka and Körtvélyesi 
2017), were proposed first, and were therefore central to the new accession talks 
framework—and an indication that Member States will pay greater attention to the 
rule of law in candidate countries in the future.
France suggested that once a country opened accession talks, it would start going 
through the first phase, and the EU would reward each successfully completed stage 
with entry to different EU structures and programmes (such as Eurojust, the research 
and science programme, the EU banking union, and perhaps access to the EU’s cus-
toms union and the single market or Europol)32. The rationale of the ‘rewards’ is 
that, in the previous format of ‘opening and closing the 35 chapters of the acquis’, 
it was difficult to explain—not only to the citizens of the candidate country, but also 
to the voters in the 27 EU Member States—what were the associated benefits33. The 
French proposal also suggested that the Member States should have a more direct 
say in the accession talks, and have the option of cancelling the talks if they see 
a candidate country backsliding on the rule of law or other fundamental values of 
the EU34. This approach represents a drastic shift from the previous policy, where 
Member States left the technical side of the accession talks up to the Commission. 
Member States having the option to cancel accession talks due to backsliding goes 
beyond the soft law mechanism used by the Commission, modelled around the 
OMC, and is instead a hard law approach based on a ‘sticks and carrots’ strategy to 
promote the rule of law (Himmrich 2019).
In January 2020, when the new Commission’s new President Ursula von der 
Leyen took office, the Commission was tasked to revise the accession talks frame-
work using the French proposal as a basis; reforming the rule of law was central to 
the thinking on how to improve the framework. On 5 February 2020, the Commis-
sion published its own proposal for reforming the framework, entitled ‘New Meth-
odology for the Accession Negotiations’,35 adopted by the Member States in the 
Council in March 2020. The main changes according the ‘New Methodology’ docu-
ment is that the EU candidate country will no longer negotiate its accession into 
the EU based upon the 35 chapters of acquis framework, as is currently being used 
for Serbia, and Montenegro, and these 35 chapters are to be reorganised into six 
32 The EU enlargement process under French proposal would be more gradual, and once a EU Candidate 
State graduates from the seventh phase, it could become a full member of the European Union.
33 Unlike visa liberalisation, where citizens of the Western Balkans could perceive the progress more 
directly related to them, and see the positive difference of not having to obtain a visa in order to enter the 
EU Schengen Area.
34 The Member States are concerned that the Western Balkans might become the next Hungary or 
Poland within the EU, given that the majority of the countries in the Western Balkans are led by auto-
crats with little respect for the rule of law, human rights, and/or liberal democratic values.
35 European Commission (2020), ‘Communication on Enhancing the Accession Process: A Credible EU 
Perspective for the Western Balkans’, Communication from The Commission to The European Parlia-
ment, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions, 
COM (2020) 57 final.
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thematic clusters: (1) Fundamentals; (2) Internal Market; (3) Competitiveness and 
Inclusive Growth; (4) Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity; (5) Resources, 
Agriculture, and Cohesion; and (6) External Relations. The first cluster, Fundamen-
tals, is focused mainly on respecting and upholding EU fundamental rights, and on 
reforming the independent institutions such as the judicial system, so that the state is 
able to uphold the rule of law and democratic standards laid out in the Copenhagen 
criteria.
This new accession talks framework of 2020 has incorporated the major recom-
mendations proposed by France. The Commission, in line with the French proposal, 
has suggested more tangible rewards to EU candidate states—such as integrating 
them into certain EU policy areas, possibly allowing them to enter into the banking 
union, the educational programme, and participating in the European arrest warrant 
scheme, and also injecting more direct funding and investment to boost their econo-
mies. However, such rewards are only on offer to candidate states able to show tan-
gible progress and a track record in upholding the rule of law.
On 24 March 2020, the foreign ministers of the 27 Member States reached 
a political consensus to give the green light36 to start accession talks with North 
Macedonia and Albania, based upon the new accession talks framework of 202037. 
The Member States were satisfied with the Commission recommendations to open 
accession talks with North Macedonia and no further conditions were deemed nec-
essary. However, for Albania, the Member States rejected the Commission recom-
mendations to open accession talks unconditionally38. Instead, the Member States 
attached a set of 15 pre-conditions which must be fulfilled before Albania is techni-
cally permitted to open accession talks. Thus, the case of Albania is more complex, 
and not based on a soft law mechanism alone, but a mix of hard and soft law that 
goes beyond the OMC model upon which the Commission seems to have originally 
based its policy for strengthening the rule of law in the Western Balkans.
36 European Commission (2020) Press release: ‘Commission Welcomes the Green Light to Opening of 
Accession Talks with Albania and North Macedonia’ (online) Available at: https ://ec.europ a.eu/neigh 
bourh ood-enlar gemen t/news_corne r/news/commi ssion -welco mes-green -light -openi ng-acces sion-talks 
-alban ia-and-north -maced onia_en Accessed 20 May 2020.
37 European Commission (2020) Press release: ‘Commission Reports on Progress Made by Albania 
and North Macedonia’ (online) Available at: https ://ec.europ a.eu/commi ssion /press corne r/detai l/en/
IP_20_347 Accessed 20 May 2020.
38 European Council (2020) Press release: ‘Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and 
Association Process—Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia’ (online) Available at: https ://www.
consi lium.europ a.eu/en/press /press -relea ses/2020/03/25/counc il-concl usion s-on-enlar gemen t-and-stabi 
lisat ion-and-assoc iatio n-proce ss Accessed 20 May 2020.
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4  The 15 Pre‑accession Conditions for Albania
First, Albania must go through a two-stage process for the 15 pre-accession condi-
tions which must be fulfilled by the first and second accession conferences,39 which 
will involve officials from the EU and Albania40. This is the first time that such a 
format has been applied for any candidate state before it can technically open acces-
sion talks with the Union. These conditions were largely based upon a resolution 
that the German Parliament (Rüttershoff 2020) adopted in September 2019, when 
it gave the mandate to the German government to give a pro-vote in the Council 
meeting in October 2019 to open accession talks with Albania, subject to its meeting 
nine pre-accession conditions. In addition to the nine conditions established by the 
Bundestag, another six pre-accession conditions were also added to accommodate 
the concerns of France, Greece, Denmark, and the Netherlands, regarding Albania’s 
accession to the EU.
By the first Accession Conference, Albania has to fulfil six pre-conditions:
(a) The reforming and passing of the Albanian electoral law—in line with the 
recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR), and the adoption of more transparency rules for political cam-
paigns and party funding;
(b) The further implementation of judicial reform in line with the opinions of the 
Venice Commission41: in particular, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Court must reconvene after being suspended since judicial reform was adopted 
in 2016;
(c) The Albania Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SPAK) should start its work 
with indictments, and a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) should be estab-
lished42;
41 The Venice Commission, in a draft opinion issued on 29 May 2020, criticised a number of decisions 
and procedures followed in the vetting process. In particular, the Commission stressed that Albania has 
had a dysfunctional Constitutional Court and High Court for more than three years, and it must re-start 
working as soon as possible. It also made a recommendation that the vetting commissions term of nine 
years is ‘excessive’, because the vetting process needed to be ‘strictly temporary’. (online) Available at: 
https ://exit.al/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2020/05/CDL20 20016 -e-1.pdf (Accessed: 31 May 2020).
42 In Albania this is known as ‘SPAK’: the special anti-corruption and anti-organized crime proxy is a 
new constitutional institution, which will have the task of investigating and prosecuting corruption and 
organised. SPAK is composed of two organs: the special prosecutor’s office (composed of prosecutors), 
and the national investigative agency (composed of investigators). The national investigative agency is 
the operational arm of SPAK, modelled on the American FBI, who have also financed it. SPAK only 
started to function in September of 2019.
39 The accession conference is a setting where the EU and Albania will discuss the 15 pre-accession 
conditions in depth, and Albania must show credible progress in fulfilling these pre-accession conditions 
in the two accession conferences. Only after Albania has shown credible evidence in meeting the 15 pre-
accession conditions in the two accession conferences can the EU accession talks formally begun.
40 After Albania has fulfilled the 15 pre-accession conditions, the EU and Albania will technically open 
accession talks in an intergovernmental conference. The Commission will provide a timetable for the first 
accession conference, after the Covid-19 crisis, and has postponed a potential date until late autumn of 
2020. (online) Available at: https ://www.eurac tiv.com/secti on/enlar gemen t/news/enlar gemen t-packa ge-
postp oned-until -autum n-negot iatio n-frame work-to-go-ahead -in-june Accessed 20 May 2020.
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(d) The establishing of a track record in the fight against corruption, organised 
crime, and money laundering;
(e) The controlling and sanctioning of the phenomenon of unfounded asylum appli-
cations to the Member States—rejected asylum seekers must be returned to 
Albania promptly; and
(f) The safeguarding of the freedom of the press and the amendment of the media 
law—in particular, the so-called ‘anti-defamation package’—in line with the 
opinions of the Venice Commission.
After Albania has satisfactorily fulfilled these six pre-conditions, it then must 
meet an additional nine pre-conditions before the second Accession Conference 
takes place:
(a) Criminal proceedings and indictments must be issued for judges and prosecutors 
who failed the re-evaluation ‘vetting’ process;
(b) Criminal investigations should be opened for those accused of buying votes in 
the 2017 parliamentary elections and the 2019 local elections. Election fraud 
instruments are to be further strengthened for the upcoming parliamentary elec-
tion set for June 2021;
(c) A track record in fighting corruption and organised crime should be established, 
showing a clear record for proceedings against high-ranking public officials;
(d) Further progress must be exhibited in reforming the public administration;
(e) The implementation of the new electoral law for the upcoming 2021 parliamen-
tary election must be enacted;
(f) The Constitutional Court should issue a final verdict on the legality and validity 
of the local elections that took place in June 2019;
(g) The further implementation of the 2017 legislation on the protection of national 
minorities;
(h) A new census law that is in line with the recommendations of the Council of 
Europe must be adopted; and
(i) The law on property rights and ownership must be amended, and the capacities 
for the registration of property should be increased.
Incorporating and attaching these fifteen pre-accession conditions was the 
only way to reach a political consensus in the Council meeting (Rüttershoff 2020) 
between the rest of the Member States and the more reluctant members, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands, in order to obtain their political 
approval to open accession talks with Albania. At a glance, one may imagine that 
some of these pre-conditions for Albania will likely require a longer period of time 
to be fulfilled, and, more importantly, pose difficulties for establishing evidence 
quantifiable as a ‘satisfactory’ track record—in the eyes of the more reluctant Mem-
ber States—especially, in the fight against corruption and organised crime. One of 
the pre-accession conditions, for example, requires ‘investigating and prosecuting 
corruption and organised crime at the highest level of public office’. Even if there is 
a strong political will on the part of Albania to achieve this, quick results cannot be 
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demonstrated, due to the complexity that such investigations require. Furthermore, 
the language used in the pre-accession conditions is vague, and can be open to inter-
pretation as to how one might measure or quantify whether the progress made by 
Albania is acceptable for some of the more sceptical Member States; i.e., how many 
politicians, public officials, judges, and prosecutors should be imprisoned in order to 
obtain a ‘satisfactory track record’?
Let us consider Romania as an example, whose National Anti-corruption Direc-
torate the EU has promoted as a success model for the Western Balkans to follow, 
where conviction rates are about 90 per cent; the country has, to date, indicted over 
4,700 defendants since the Directorate was established in 2002 (Hoxhaj 2020). This 
includes jailing a prime minister, 18 ministers, and thousands of mid-level public 
officials and politicians on charges of corruption and abuse of public office. It must 
be noted that Romania’s National Anti-corruption Directorate’s successful track 
record of indictments and convictions only began in 2010 (Mungiu-Pippidi 2018)—
eight years after its initiation. The Albanian Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office 
(SPAK) was only established in late 2019, and one cannot anticipate that Albania 
could have a similar successful track record such as that seen in Romania until at 
least 2030, especially in indicting high-ranking profile public officials.
Nevertheless, there are some encouraging signs, such as SPAK charging the for-
mer Attorney General of Albania Adriatik Llalla (who served from 2012 to 2017) 
with failure to declare the full extent of his property—this case is pending in the 
courts43. It must be noted that there was huge pressure to investigate the former 
Attorney General due to the US State Department, under section 7031(c) of the FY 
2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act,44 publicly barring Llalla and his family from 
entering the United States due to ‘his involvement in significant corruption’ in Feb-
ruary 201845. Two other discredited Albanian politicians have been publicly barred 
by the government from US entry in 201846 and 2019,47 and privately, it is believed 
that hundreds of politicians, judges, and prosecutors are ineligible for entry to the 
US under suspicion of being involved in corruption and organised crime.
43 The United States Department Communication on Public Designation of Adriatik Llalla under sec-
tion 7031(c) of the FY 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act. (online) Available at: https ://www.state 
.gov/publi c-desig natio n-of-adria tik-llall a-under -secti on-7031c -of-the-fy-2017-conso lidat ed-appro priat 
ions-act Accessed 20 May 2020.
44 The US Consolidated Appropriations Act 2017 builds on the Magnitsky Act of 2012, which author-
ises the US government to sanction those whom it sees as human rights offenders, freezing their assets 
and banning them from entering the US.
45 The US Consolidated Appropriations Act 2017, in cases where it has credible information that foreign 
officials have been involved in significant corruption or violations of human rights, those individuals and 
their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the US.
46 The United States Department Communication on Public Designation of Tom Doshi under 
Sect. 7031(c) of the FY 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act. (online) Available at: https ://www.state 
.gov/publi c-desig natio n-of-tom-doshi -under -secti on-7031c -of-the-fy-2017-conso lidat ed-appro priat ions-
act Accessed 20 May 2020.
47 The United States Department Communication on Public Designation Due to Involvement in Signifi-
cant Corruption of Albanian Mayor of Durrës, Vangjush Dako. (online) Available at: https ://www.state 
.gov/publi c-desig natio n-due-to-invol vemen t-in-signi fican t-corru ption -of-alban ian-mayor -of-durre s-vangj 
ush-dako Accessed 20 May 2020.
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In Albania’s case, the EU has tried, as part of its enlargement policy efforts, to 
support the fight against corruption and organised crime by promoting judicial sys-
tem reform as the first major step in strengthening the rule of law, in line with the 
Copenhagen criteria. However, in so doing, the EU has not used a soft law approach 
such as described in the OMC, but more of a traditional hard law approach. The 
section below explains how the EU has made the judicial reform a pre-requisite in 
Albania. Given that all of the Western Balkans countries have serious issues with 
high levels of corruption and close links between high-ranking public officials and 
organised crime networks, what follows is an insight into how the EU’s Albanian 
judicial reform model—as the first major step in strengthening the rule of law—
might be replicated across the rest of the Western Balkans.
5  The EU Rule of Law Initiative and Policy Experimentation 
in Albania
The judicial system in Albania is perceived as being highly corrupt, with very close 
links to politicians and organised-crime networks48. As a result, the EU has identi-
fied the judicial system as one of the most corrupt public sectors in every annual 
progress report since Albania was granted the EU candidate status in 2014. In its EU 
conditionalities, the Commission has repeatedly suggested that if Albania doesn’t 
reform the judicial system in line with the Copenhagen criteria, it is unlikely that 
accession talks will be open between Albania and the EU (Vurmo 2020). As a result 
of the EU conditionalities and internal political pressure to make progress in open-
ing accession talks with the EU, the Albanian Parliament appointed a special com-
mittee in November 2014, with a mandate to make proposals for the reform of the 
justice system in line with the EU conditionalities and the Copenhagen criteria. The 
committee had three tasks: (1) to provide an in-depth analysis of the function of the 
judiciary; (2) to outline the main objectives of the judicial reform; and (3) to pro-
pose amendments to the laws that will require changes in order to enable the imple-
mentation of the judicial reforms, especially the constitutional amendments in line 
with the EU conditionalities, which would allow Albania—on paper, at least—to 
open and close chapters of the acquis chapters 23 and 24, related to the rule of law 
and fundamental rights (Hoxhaj 2020).
The parliamentary committee was assisted by a technical secretariat, and in 
particular by international experts, which ensured that Albania was developing 
its proposal for judicial reform in line with the EU conditionalities. The two main 
international experts are the EU’s ‘Consolidation of the Justice System in Albania’ 
project (EURALIUS),49 and the US Department of Justice’s Overseas Prosecutorial 
48 Albania’s Vetting Commission dismissed in 2018 a ‘High Court Judge’ over finding connections with 
organised crime groups. (online) Available at: https ://balka ninsi ght.com/2018/07/30/alban ia-high-court 
-judge -vette d-over-conne ction -with-organ ized-crime -07-30-2018 Accessed 20 May 2020.
49 EURALIUS is an EU-funded technical assistance project that seeks the strengthening of the Albanian 
Justice. (online) Available at: https ://eural ius.eu/index .php/en Accessed 20 May 2020.
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Development, Assistance, and Training Program (known as OPDAT),50 both of 
which offered technical assistance in drafting the judicial reform. These experts are 
currently monitoring the judicial reform implementation process, and are expected 
to continue to do so for a full eight years. In September 2015, the group of experts 
presented the draft legal package of the judicial reform, which the Albanian parlia-
mentary committee forwarded to the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for its 
opinions (Anastasi 2018) to certify its constitutionality.
The Venice Commission issued its response in early 2016, and made recommen-
dations on how judicial reform might be implemented and monitored by an inter-
national monitoring body composed of former judges and prosecutors from the EU 
and the US, which would offer insurance that the reform was going to be imple-
mented in line with the Copenhagen criteria. It also made recommendations on the 
constitutional changes to enable the first part of implementing the judicial reform 
legal package, and how the powers of the new anti-corruption bodies should be con-
strained under the constitution (Richard, Benvindo, Rado and Zhilla 2017). Almost 
all the political parties accepted the Venice Commission’s recommendations in 
principle, but there was disagreement between members of the governing Socialist 
Party of Albania and the Democratic Party of Albania opposition party about a legal 
clause which would have allowed EU and US magistrates to monitor the implemen-
tation of the judicial reform—in particular, during the vetting process of the judges 
and prosecutors in Albania. The approach proposed by the EU is a sign that the 
Member States have deep distrust in candidate states’ ability to reform themselves. 
It also suggests that judicial reform in Albania is based on a hard law mechanism, 
rather than the soft law found in the EU approach of the OMC model. Ultimately, 
under huge pressure from the Commission and leaders of EU government, and even 
more so from the US government, all 140 MPs in the Albanian parliament (Gjevori 
2018) bowed to external pressure, and voted unanimously in favour of the consti-
tutional changes in June 2016, in order to open the path to the first phase of imple-
menting the judicial reform, which—in theory—would put Albania in a favourable 
position to open accession talks with the EU.
The legal package for judicial reform included the introduction of 46 new consti-
tution articles, which were all related to reorganising the judicial system. The con-
stitutional changes would also restructure the relationship between the executive and 
the legislative branches, with the judicial branch being allowed more autonomy. The 
main changes to the Constitution can be summarised as follows (Hoxhaj 2020):
50 OPDAT in Albania is involved in reviewing criminal-justice legislation; training judges, police and 
prosecutors; providing law-enforcement equipment; and providing technical assistance aimed at estab-
lishing more effective law enforcement structures. (online) Available at: https ://www.justi ce.gov/crimi 
nal-opdat Accessed 20 May 2020.
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(a) The establishing of new vetting bodies, entitled the ‘International Monitoring 
Operation’51 and the ‘Independent Committee of Qualifications’,52 with a legal 
mandate to re-evaluate all of the 800 members of the judiciary;
(b) The establishing of two new investigative bodies to fight corruption and organ-
ised crime, entitled the ‘Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Struc-
ture’, and the ‘National Bureau of Investigation’;
(c) The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court should be transformed into 
career courts, and nominations and appointments of their members should not 
be carried out by the executive branch, to reduce the potential for political influ-
ence;
(d) Judges and prosecutors are to be given more autonomy, and to be selected 
through a self-governing body that can propose and appoint future members 
to serve in the judiciary, including the selection and nomination of the attorney 
general.
The implementation of judicial reform started in late 2017, with a single focus 
on vetting all 800 officials of the Albanian judiciary. The vetting of these officials is 
based upon three criteria: (1) assets; (2) background; and (3) proficiency assessment 
(Hoxhaj 2020). To date, the results of the vetting process on almost half of the offi-
cials has been dismissal, or in some cases voluntary resignation, because of failure 
to justify their assets.
The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court were given priority when the 
vetting process began, and, after the re-evaluation of the judges sitting in the Con-
stitutional Court, seven out of the nine judges proved inadequate to occupy a post 
in the judiciary (Bara and Bara 2017). Of the Supreme Court judges, only four of 
nineteen passed the vetting process. Judges in both the Constitutional and Supreme 
Courts were unable to justify their assets. The indication is that they failed the vet-
ting process because their assets had been acquired through bribery or corruption 
related to the cases that they had adjudicated (Hoxhaj 2020).
Corruption in the judicial system, and more broadly in other spheres of public 
life is widespread in Albania, as well as in the rest of the Western Balkans (Zvekic 
2017). According to the Balkan Barometer of 2018, citizens of the Western Balkans 
are placing corruption as the third ‘burning issue’ in the region, after unemployment 
51 The International Monitoring Operation is a monitoring operation set up to oversee the vetting process 
of judiciary members in Albania. (online) Available at: https ://www.cilc.nl/proje ct/inter natio nal-monit 
oring -opera tion (Accessed: 20 May 2020).
52 The Independent Qualification Commission is a constitutional entity directly responsible for the 
assessment and re-evaluation of judges, prosecutors, inspectors, legal advisors and other members of 
Albania’s justice system. It has revised some criticism in 2020 regards to the transparency of re-evalu-
ating judicial officials, as some judges and prosecutors that have engaged in petty corruption or served 
during Communism have passed the vetting process—it was hard to see how they passed the vetting 
process against the integrity criteria. See for more: Vladimir Karaj (2020) ‘Transparency Questions over 
Albanian Effort to Rid Courts of Corruption’ Balkan Insight. (online) Available at: https ://balka ninsi ght.
com/2020/01/24/trans paren cy-quest ions-over-alban ian-effor t-to-rid-court s-of-corru ption (Accessed: 20 
May 2020).
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and healthcare.53 Similar findings were identified by the latest Transparency Interna-
tional Corruption Index (CPI) and the Commission progress reports for the Western 
Balkans in 2019. As the section below indicates, the level of corruption in the coun-
tries of the Western Balkans is higher than most EU Member States; only Bulgaria 
scored the same as the Western Balkans.
For the Commission’s rule of law flagship initiative to be successful when fully 
developed and deployed in practice, consideration must be given to how challenging 
it will be to successfully strengthen the rule of law, as the conditions are so unfa-
vourable in the Western Balkans. First, there is a high level of corruption, and sec-
ond, most of the Western Balkans states are semi-autocratic or hybrid democracies 
(Bieber 2018), with little political will to fulfil the EU rule of law conditionalities, 
and, just as importantly, to uphold them.
5.1  The Level of Corruption in the Western Balkans Weakens the Rule of Law
The Transparency International Index (CPI) of 2019 indicates that corruption lev-
els in the Western Balkans are stagnating. Apart from Montenegro, each country 
in the region has achieved between 36 and 39 points, which puts them between 87 
and 99 places out of 180 countries in the CPI54. Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia 
saw perceived corruption levels rise in the past year, while Bosnia and Herzego-
vina recorded its worst result since 2012. North Macedonia and Albania share the 
worst ranking in the Western Balkans. Notwithstanding the CPI’s limitations, coun-
try scores give a useful snapshot for researchers and policymakers about the level of 
corruption in the Western Balkans, and the possible challenges for the rule of law 
initiative to be a transformative tool in strengthening the rule of law in this region.
The CPI 2019 found that Serbia scored 39, dropping two points since last year55. 
This trend can be explained as the Serbian government continues to undermine the 
institutions that are responsible for maintaining the rule of law. In 2018, despite 
strong opposition from NGOs, lawyers’ associations and other civil society activists, 
the government pushed for increased influence over the judiciary56. Furthermore, 
the government has openly violated and amended its own anti-corruption policies, 
proposed as a response to the 2013–2018 Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 
for Chapter 23 EU Integration (2016–2018)57.
54 Maja Zivanovic, (2020) ‘New Transparency Report Gives Balkan Countries Poor Scores’. Balkan 
Insight. (online) Available at: https ://balka ninsi ght.com/2019/01/29/balka n-count ries-perce ived-as-corru 
pted-repor t-01-28-2019/ Accessed 5 September 2020.
55 Transparency International (2020) ‘Serbia 2019 CPI’ (online) Available at: https ://www.trans paren 
cy.org/en/count ries/serbi a Accessed 5 September 2020.
56 Martin Russell, (2019) ‘Serbia at risk of authoritarianism? European Parliamentary Research Ser-
vice’ (online) Available at: https ://www.europ arl.europ a.eu/RegDa ta/etude s/BRIE/2019/63794 4/EPRS_
BRI(2019)63794 4_EN.pdf?fbcli d=IwAR1 irVOQ 0Lyri xf8HN nute5 55Y79 WRg8y FBWaz 6OarD kOfPW 
3FBeX JB_PWs Accessed 5 September 2020.
57 European Commission, (2019) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy – Serbia 2019 Report’. (COM(2019) 260 final) 
53 Regional Cooperation Council, ‘Balkan Barometer 2018: Public Opinion Survey’ 2018, https ://www.
rcc.int/pubs/66/balka n-barom eter-2018-publi c-opini on-surve y .
The EU Rule of Law Initiative Towards the Western Balkans 
123
Bosnia and Herzegovina scored 36—the country’s worst ranking since 2012, 
thereby dropping 11 places compared to 2018 in the CPI58. According to the report 
by Transparency International, the deterioration of the level of corruption in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is linked to the irregularities of election campaigns, new laws related 
to financing political parties and voting suppression. In other words, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina there is an increase of political corruption, and—even though there is 
evidence of election fraud according to the findings of Transparency International—
judicial institutions have so far been unable to take action to uphold the rule of law59.
Kosovo witnesses a similar trend in corruption, dropping further in 2019, only 
scoring 36 in the CPI60. There were high hopes in early 2020, when the Transpar-
ency International report suggested that Kosovo is ‘a country to watch’, due to a 
change of government led by the Vetevendosje party, who came into power with a 
promise to clean up corrupt public institutions and reform the judiciary to strengthen 
overall the rule of law61. However, this government only lasted for 50 days, and in 
that time did not implement any such reforms.
Montenegro scored 45 in the CPI in 2019, better than the rest of the Western 
Balkans states62. However, corruption and state capture remain problematic, as the 
government in 2019 proposed amendments to the ‘law on classified information’. 
According to Transparency International and a coalition of 25 Montenegrin NGOs,63 
the amendments proposed by the government could undermine the country’s free-
dom of information laws, the anti-corruption efforts, and overall the function of the 
rule of law, because the proposed law allows the government to declare informa-
tion classified at its discretion. In its progress report in 2019, the Commission64 
suggested that Montenegro should reverse the growing trend of public institutions 
58 The Transparency International (2020) ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019 CPI’ (online) Available at: 
https ://www.trans paren cy.org/en/count ries/bosni a-and-herze govin a Accessed 5 September 2020.
59 EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2019) ‘Expert Report on Rule of Law issues 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (online) Available at: https ://europ a.ba/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2019/12/Exper 
tRepo rtonR uleof Lawis suesi nBosn iaand Herze govin a.pdf?fbcli d=IwAR0 ihgFY kVjq7 6Sv0F r9lyn cKA56 
WtPIF XjUZz E9jPw msD40 lxHNJ CogFE o Accessed 5 September 2020.
Footnote 57 (continued)
60 The Transparency International (2020) ‘Kosovo 2019 CPI’. (online) Available at: https ://www.trans 
paren cy.org/en/count ries/kosov o Accessed 5 September 2020.
61 Aidan Hehir, (2020) ‘Kosovo’s government just fell – but it’s down to US meddling rather than coro-
navirus. The Coversation’ (online) Available at: https ://theco nvers ation .com/kosov os-gover nment -just-
fell-but-its-down-to-us-meddl ing-rathe r-than-coron aviru s-13486 2 Accessed 5 September 2020.
62 The Transparency International (2020) ‘Montenegro 2019 CPI’ (online) Available at: https ://www.
trans paren cy.org/en/count ries/monte negro Accessed 5 September 2020.
63 The Transparency International, (2019) ‘Montenegro – Widely condemnded law does not deserve a 
second chance’ (online) Available at: https ://www.trans paren cy.org/en/press /monte negro -widel y-conde 
mnded -law-does-not-deser ve-a-secon d-chanc e Accessed 5 September 2020.
64 European Commission, (2019) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2019 
Communication on EU Enlargement Policy – Montenegro 2019 Report’. (COM(2019) 260 final) (online) 
Available at: https ://ec.europ a.eu/neigh bourh ood-enlar gemen t/sites /near/files /20190 529-monte negro 
-repor t.pdf Accessed 5 September 2020.
(online):ilable at https ://ec.europ a.eu/neigh bourh ood-enlar gemen t/sites /near/files /20190 529-serbi a-repor 
t.pdf Accessed 5 September 2020.
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declaring information classified as a matter of priority, as this prevents any oversight 
by independent institutions or civil society on issues related to corruption, and there-
fore, limits the ability of the judicial system to uphold the rule of law.
North Macedonia shared the worst result in the Western Balkans together with 
Albania, scoring just 35 points in the CPI in 201965. The Transparency Report and 
the Commission country report66 suggest that North Macedonia has made good 
progress in the fight against corruption, and further consolidating a track record of 
prosecuting and adjudicating high-level corruption cases. However, in 2018–19, the 
country’s rule of law was tested to its core, after its special prosecutor for organ-
ised crime and corruption Katica Janeva67 was arrested on suspicion of offering leni-
ency in exchange for a bribe to a businessman indicted for corruption. In June 2020, 
Janeva was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment after being found guilty of 
accepting bribes and luxury gifts as part of an extortion scheme68. Janeva’s case has 
fuelled major political turmoil in North Macedonia over the last two years, and has 
been a major test for the courts to demonstrate their ability to uphold the rule of law.
In 2019, Albania dropped seven places in the CPI, scoring 35 points out of 100, 
and has dropped 23 places in just over three years since the judicial reform begun69. 
As a result, Albania is perceived to be the most corrupt country in the Western Bal-
kans. Both the Freedom House report for Albania and Transparency International 
found that issues of conflict of interest, abuse of state resources for personal and 
electoral purposes, insufficient disclosure of political party and campaign financing, 
and a lack of media independence are prevalent in the Albania70. Despite a number 
of anti-corruption reforms since the judicial reform was adopted, corruption is wide-
spread across the state, and is impeding its ability to uphold the rule of law (Hoxhaj 
2020).
The levels of corruption indicated by the Transparency International 2019 CPI in 
all Western Balkans states is clearly impeding its chances to make a successful case 
for EU integration. In these conditions, where corruption its high and justice can 
be bought and sold through bribery, the overall ability of law enforcement and the 
judicial system to uphold the rule of law is profoundly undermined. However, cor-
ruption is only one of the negative factors challenging the rule of law initiative in the 
67 Sinisa Jakov Marusic, (2019) ‘North Macedonia Arrests Outgoing Chief Special Prosecutor’. Balkan 
Insight. (online) Available at: https ://balka ninsi ght.com/2019/08/21/north -maced onia-arres ts-outgo ing-
chief -speci al-prose cutor / Accessed 5 September 2020.
68 Sinisa Jakov Marusic, (2020) ‘North Macedonia Jails Ex-Special Prosecutor Over “Extortion” Case’. 
Balkan Insight (online) Available at: https ://balka ninsi ght.com/2020/06/18/north -maced onia-jails -ex-
speci al-prose cutor -over-extor tion-case/ Accessed 5 September 2020.
69 The Transparency International, (2020) ‘Albania 2019 CPI’ (online) Available at: https ://www.trans 
paren cy.org/en/count ries/alban ia Accessed 5 September 2020.
70 Freedom House, (2020) ‘Nation in Transition: Albania 2020 country report’ (online) Available at: 
https ://freed omhou se.org/count ry/alban ia/natio ns-trans it/2020 Accessed 5 September 2020.
65 The Transparency International, (2020) ‘North Macedonia 2019 CPI’ (online) Available at: https ://
www.trans paren cy.org/en/count ries/maced onia-fyr Accessed 5 September 2020.
66 European Commission, (2020) ‘Update on the Republic of North Macedonia’. SWD (2020) 47 final 
(online) Available at: https ://ec.europ a.eu/neigh bourh ood-enlar gemen t/sites /near/files /updat e-on-the-
repub lic-of-north -maced onia.pdf Accessed 5 September 2020.
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Western Balkans. Crucially, there is also very little political will—both to fight this 
corruption and to strengthen the rule of law overall—in semi-authoritarian political 
systems (Kmezić 2020).
5.2  Strengthening the Rule of Law in Autocracies
The governments in the Western Balkans have been described as ‘stabilocracies’ by 
(Bieber 2020a, b), and the leaders of the government can be understood as autocrats 
that capture the state, and claim to secure stability in the Western Balkans region by 
pretending to champion European integration. However, these governments leaders 
rely on informal, clientelist structures, controlling the media, and regularly produc-
ing artificial political crises over EU conditionalities to undermine any true efforts in 
strengthening the rule of law (Radeljić and Đorđević 2020).
In the majority of the Western Balkan countries, autocrats are in power, and 
thus only a handful of people control the economy and the distribution of politi-
cal authority (Bieber 2020b). Checks and balances, and the separation of powers 
between the judicial, executive and legislative branch are weak almost to the point 
of inexistence. Therefore, government leaders have almost absolute control over the 
country’s affairs71—and in this environment, the space to strengthen the rule of law, 
or expose organised-crime networks and corruption becomes far more challenging. 
So far in the Western Balkans, political elites often simply avoid prosecution, as was 
the case with the former Prime Minister of North Macedonia, Nikola Gruevski, who 
fled to Hungary72 days before he was due to be jailed on charges of abuse of power 
and corruption.
Despite EU conditions on curbing corruption and ensuring institutions (particu-
larly the judicial system) are free of political influence, many governments across 
the Western Balkans have so far failed to show any true political will to strengthen 
the rule of law (Kmezić 2020). Political elites have excessive and unchecked power, 
and there are limited mechanisms to hold them to account. Strengthening the rule of 
law (Mendelski 2018) is clearly in opposition to the interests of those autocrats in 
power, and thus, far less likely to succeed. Perhaps this is why, since 2018, there has 
been no action plan to strengthen the rule of law in the Western Balkans as a direct 
outcome of the EU-Western Balkans strategy?
In an environment where public institutions cannot fully safeguard the rule of law, 
due to state capture by autocratic leaders, it is imperative that civil society actors, 
such as journalist, academics and NGOs are supported to play a more central role in 
scrutinising (Stojarová 2020) the reforms related to EU rule of law conditionalities. 
71 Jovan Bliznakovski, Borjan Gjuzelov and Misha Popovikj, (2017) ‘The Informal Life of Political Par-
ties in the Western Balkan Societies’. University College London, INFORMAL project (online) Availa-
ble at: https ://www.ucl.ac.uk/ssees /sites /ssees /files /idscs -infor mal_life_of_polit ical_parti es-repor t-27092 
017.pdf
72 Sinisa Jakov Marusic, (2019) ‘Hungary Refuses to Extradite Gruevski to North Macedonia’. Balkan 
Insight (online) Available at: https ://balka ninsi ght.com/2019/06/27/hunga ry-refus es-to-extra dite-gruev 
ski-to-north -maced onia/ Accessed 5 September 2020.
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So far, the theoretical design of the rule of law initiative is largely based on the 
OMC model, which entitles a discussion between members of the Commission and 
the governments on the rule of law reform—but there is no formal framework for the 
inclusion of civil society actors. However, the Commission may use this opportunity 
to include civil society in the implementation phase of the rule of law initiative, and 
more importantly in the design of national action plans related to the strengthening 
of the rule of law in each of the Western Balkans countries—such inclusion could be 
a significant factor in the initiative becoming a transformative tool.
6  Lessons Learned From Albania and Improving the Rule of Law 
Initiative
The first step in the EU-Western Balkans 2018 Enlargement Strategy Rule of Law 
Initiative is judicial reform. As shown in Albania, this approach mainly involves 
vetting the members of judiciary. However, this primary focus must expand to 
make space for civil society actors to participate, moving away from the top-down 
approach which includes only EU and state government officials. Furthermore, the 
rule of law initiative must also include new investment in the judicial system’s infra-
structure and management (Becker 2018), making it more accessible for citizens. 
Vetting judicial officials is a crucial part of the rule of law initiative, but in moving 
forward, it is just as important that the judiciary is funded appropriately—and here 
the rule of law initiative may play a role in coordinating investments in the Western 
Balkans justice system.
Compared to the average across the 27 EU Member States, the judiciary systems 
in the Western Balkans are underfunded, and allocated budgets are mostly for day-
to-day running costs. The Council of Europe ‘Plan of Action to Strengthen the Judi-
cial Independence and Impartiality’73 suggests that budgetary constraint (Kocevska 
2019) is a way to implicitly control the resource mobilisation process of the judi-
ciary system. In other words, judicial independence is difficult to achieve without 
financial freedom.
The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ),74 in its latest 
report published in 2018, suggests that the judiciary in the Western Balkans does 
indeed face budgetary constraint in comparison to EU Member States. Montene-
gro and Bosnia and Herzegovina distributed 1–1.4% of GDP to the judicial sys-
tem; Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia judicial system budgets are between 
0.26–0.8% of GDP. This means that the judicial system budget per capita in the 
Western Balkans is highest in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, both allo-
cating around 25 euros per capita, whereas North Macedonia allocates 20 euros, and 
73 Council of Europe, (2016) ‘Plan of Action to Strengthen the Judicial Independence and Impartiality’. 
CM (2016)36 final (online) Available at: https ://www.coe.int/en/web/cdcj/judic ial-indep enden ce-and-
impar tiali ty Accessed 5 September 2020.
74 The CEPEJ was established in 2002 by the Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe, and pub-
lishes a report every two years assessing the efficiency of judicial systems in the 47 Council of Europe 
Member States.
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Albania allocates less than 10 euros per inhabitant for the judicial system. The aver-
age EU Member State judicial system budget allocation is 64 euros per capita, with 
a median value of 53 euros per capita75.
This data suggests that the Western Balkans countries are not allocating suf-
ficient funding to the judiciary in comparison to the EU member states and thus, 
when the joint action plan is developed, there must be an increase in such fund-
ing. If commensurate funding were to be allocated in Albania, perhaps—as of Sep-
tember 2020—the country would not have over 35,000 cases pending adjudication? 
Since the start of the justice reform, the country has been without a Constitutional 
and Supreme Court, and critics suggest that this unprecedented situation has opened 
the door for constitutional violation by the government, in itself a threat to the rule 
of law. Both courts are anticipated to start functioning by the end of 2020 or early 
2021, but as long as Albania continues to be without a functional Constitutional and 
Supreme Court, the government has the ability to freely pass legislation in parlia-
ment without due care to the constitutionality of laws, as there is no court with the 
legal mechanism in place to oversee whether legislation may infringe upon the con-
stitution and the rule of law.
The fact of the large number of cases pending in Albanian courts has received 
major criticism with regard to the judicial reform the EU has promoted, and crit-
ics suggest that as long as the courts are not working, this represents a violation of 
the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights (Gerards and Glas 
2017), as citizens have not had appropriate access to justice system since the judi-
cial reform was passed in June 201676. The USAID and the Albanian High Judicial 
Council signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in April 2020 as a result 
of this criticism, to provide some financial and technical assistance in order to deal 
with the workload accumulated as a result of the courts not working77. Notwith-
standing this attempt to offset some of the damage, this is a lesson that the EU may 
learn from Albania—and the rule of law initiative could prioritise the allocation of 
appropriate resources and funding in the rest of the Western Balkans, to prevent sig-
nificant impairment of the judicial system whilst vetting is ongoing.
What the Albania example shows is that the EU enlargement policy has made 
the issue regarding the rule of law central to its newly revised ‘Enlargement Policy 
And Accession Talks Framework’ in EU candidate states. Reforming the judiciary 
is a major part of the conditionalities of the EU enlargement policy post-2018. The 
requirement is to strengthen the rule of law, thus not only meeting the Copenhagen 
75 European Judicial Systems Efficiency and Quality of Justice, 2018, p.26.
76 It can be argued the judicial reform has technically violated Articles 6 and 13 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, as citizens have not been able to have access to justice since 2016, even 
though the Albanian government and the EU has justified the suspension of the courts as necessary to 
root out the level of corruption, and allow time for the vetting process. (online) Available at: https ://europ 
eanwe stern balka ns.com/2019/11/13/vetti ng-proce ss-in-alban ia-the-march ing-failu re Accessed 20 May 
2020.
77 Euronews Albania, (2020) ‘USAID to Assist Albanian Courts with 35,000 Pending Cases’ (online) 
Available at: https ://euron ews.al/en/alban ia/2020/04/30/usaid -to-assis t-alban ian-court s-with-35-000-
cases -backl og Accessed 20 May 2020.
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criteria on paper, but demonstrating a tangible track record of subscribing to the EU 
model of liberal democracy.
It is too early to draw a concrete conclusion whether the Albania rule of law 
reform is a success story as a result of the EU rule of law conditionalities until the 
whole process has been completed, and it’s still too soon to decide if the EU model 
used in Albania can be championed in the rest of the Western Balkans through the 
rule of law initiative—and yet, so far, the process is delivering some encouraging 
results, as half of the vetted judicial officials have been expelled from the judicial 
system due to unexplained assets and wealth acquired through corruption.
However, what Albania has clearly already demonstrated is that the EU cannot 
rely too heavily on soft law mechanisms and those based on the OMC model of 
governance, as designed so far in the EU-Western Balkans 2018 strategy. The OMC 
model of governance is an important soft law mechanism that can help both the 
Commission and members of the Western Balkans governments to achieve the tech-
nical standard part of the rule of law reform. In particular, the OMC could ensure 
that the quality of the legal framework (as observed in the case of Albania) is aligned 
with the Copenhagen criteria, before constitutional changes can be made to allow the 
implementation of rule of law-related reform later. Furthermore, the OMC model 
of governance used by the Commission can help the Western Balkans to learn best 
practice from the EU in improving the legal framework, once it has been initially 
drafted. However, in order to acquire the broad political consensus and the political 
will—by all political parties—to actually adopt judicial reform and make the neces-
sary constitutional changes that can allow the implementation of rule of law-related 
reforms, a soft law instrument such as the OMC model may be insufficient. This 
is because major disagreements can occur— for example, in Albania, with regard 
to the authorising of EU and US former magistrates to monitor and empower the 
vetting and potential dismissal of members of the judiciary in a candidate state. In 
practical and political terms, such imposition is an unpalatable approach in the cur-
rent climate—not only in the Western Balkans but in the EU Member States—as it 
appears that national sovereignty is being disrupted when executive power over judi-
cial matters is shifted to an international body or EU-affiliated bodies. In Albania, 
getting judicial reform through parliament, and making the necessary amendments 
to the constitution was only possible via huge external pressure from influential EU 
governments such as Germany, and in particular through US government influence 
over Albania politicians (Mustafaj 2020). Internal political processes, even when 
framed as responding to meeting EU conditionalities and therefore giving the coun-
try a better chance of opening accession talks with the EU, were not enough to initi-
ate or sustain such important judicial reform (Mustafaj 2020) that might strengthen 
overall the rule of law.
7  Conclusion
The latest EU enlargement policy developments are an indication that, post-Brexit, 
the Union wants to revive its enlargement project with future expansion into the 
Western Balkans. By targeting areas of common interest, the six flagship initiatives 
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in the EU-Western Balkans 2018 strategy can be seen as proof of the EU’s renewed 
policy efforts to support the Western Balkans to resolve and make sustainable pro-
gress in their internal socio-economic issues. The initiative to strengthen the rule of 
law in the EU-Western Balkans 2018 strategy, if applied in an orderly manner, may 
accelerate the process of making the judicial systems of the Western Balkans less 
prone to corruption, with a clear system of check and balance, a more independent 
judicial system from the executive branch, and more closely aligned with the EU 
best practice standards.
However, strengthening the rule of law on paper, by passing a judicial reform 
package as in the case of Albania, shows that it is not sufficient to strengthen and 
uphold the rule of law in practice. The rule of law initiative for the Western Bal-
kans is a promising new approach by the European Commission, and, with the intro-
duction of the new accession talks framework for Albania and North Macedonia in 
2020, it has the potential to generate a more productive platform for the EU and the 
Western Balkans to engage in an evidence-based policy dialogue. However, the EU 
policy objective should not only be focused on vetting judicial officials as observed 
in Albania. Policy should also focus on institutional capacity-building, and invest-
ment in the judicial infrastructure so that it is more accessible to the citizens of the 
Western Balkans.
The rule of law initiative so far has only served as a platform for dialogue between 
the Commission and members of the Western Balkans, and although it based on a 
soft law mechanism after the OMC model of governance, it is very much a top-
down approach, and has not fully engaged with members of the civil society. In the 
absence of independent institutions and state capture, formally including members 
of the civil society in designing national action plans on reforming the rule of law in 
the Western Balkans can help both the EU and the Western Balkans to ensure that 
governments are implementing the rule of law-related reforms in line with the EU 
conditionalities, as well as empowering civil society to take a more proactive role in 
upholding the rule of law.
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